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Introduction
In the recent nancial crisis, some important observations about the characteristics of the nancial market, its players, contagion eects and policymakers' response could be made. Governments and central banks have been faced with troubled banks and a challenging tradeo: should they allow bank insolvencies, which would lead to contagion eects and thus to enormous welfare losses, or should they rescue them and let the public pay for the losses. In addition, while banks were rescued using huge sums of money from the taxpayer, the public debated about high compensation payments considered to be unfair, especially in banking industries. Policymakers included this item in their discussions and partly responded by reforming the tax treatment of managerial compensation, e.g. by imposing bonus taxes. This paper combines three aspects from the nancial crisis: a) the systemic risk of nancial institutions that are not systemic individually but on a collective basis, b) high compensation payments to bankers, and c) bonus taxation. By analyzing these aspects in a principal-agent model of two banks, the paper presents eects of a) bailouts and b) bonus taxation on managerial incentives and risk taking.
In this model, if agents have to be incentivized to select a project only when its success probability is high enough, then anticipated bailout increases risk-taking.
Moreover, we show how bonus taxation reduces overall risk taking. While leading politicians emphasized the necessity of a coordinated approach with all major economies implementing the tax at a global level 1 , the results suggest that also unilateral bonus taxation eliminates an equilibrium with high risk taking and causes positive external eects on other countries.
There are two main opportunities for banks to become systemic: on the one hand, banks may be large and thereby systemic on an individual level, i.e. they are too big to fail. On the other hand, banks may be too small to be too-big-tofail, but strongly interconnected and thereby systemic collectively, i.e. too many to fail. While the rst opportunity has already been studied in the literature, this paper focuses on the latter opportunity. We assume that only simultaneously failing banks receive a bailout. A single failing bank is not going to be bailed out. territory can be expected to or be able to act on its own.
In the last decades, nancial markets have integrated more and more, and in this move also cross-border banking increased. 2 Degryse et. al (2010) have shown, that this increase in cross-border banking also caused an increase of nancial contagion by banks. For policymakers, this is relevant when it comes to the decision whether or not to bail out failing banks. Irrespective of size, the more interconnected a bank is, the more systemic it is. This is especially the case, if banks can increase the likelihood of a bailout by correlating their investments. In the extreme, both are either successful, or fail simultaneously, thereby exerting higher pressure on the regulator for a bailout. For the possible future regulator, this leads to the uncomfortable situation where he would like to prevent banks' incentive to coordinate, but cannot credibly commit to a no bailout-clause. 3 Another issue in the public debate were high compensation payments and its taxation. From an economic point of view, asymmetric information calls for bonus payments in order to incentivize the agent to act in the principal's interest.
Nevertheless, it has been considered as unfair that bankers receive high bonus payments in times in which taxpayers have to bear the costs of their decisions.
In response to that, several countries introduced a surtax on managerial bonuses.
For the scal year 2009-2010, the UK introduced a 50% bank payroll tax which was levied on bonus payments for bankers higher than 25.000 GBP (UK Finance Act 2010, Schedule 1). Likewise, other countries raised bonus taxes for banks supported by the government: in 2011, Ireland introduced a 90% tax, while the US House of Representatives approved such a 90% tax already in March 2009. 4 The results of the model propose the following: If banks can anticipate bailouts, market discipline weakens in terms that banks incentivize their bankers to take on higher risk. In a situation without bonus taxation, banks foresee that they are systemic in a herd and thus can coordinate on an equilibrium with high risk taking, taking advantage of the systemic risk they collectively cause. If, on the other hand, bankers' bonuses are taxed properly, then the taxed banker requests a higher gross bonus payment to be compensated for the additional tax burden.
Thereby incentives for risk taking become more expensive such that a proper 2 For an analysis of cross-border banking in Europe see Allen et. al (2011) . bonus tax can circumvent excessive risk taking in equilibrium. Moreover, for the equilibrium with excessive risk taking to break down, it is sucient if only one manager is subject to a bonus tax. Then, bonus taxation reestablishes market discipline as it prevents market failure due to banks' collective moral hazard.
Related Literature
With respect to literature, this paper belongs to several strands of literature. In terms of methodology, it is related to the literature on executive compensation and especially to the literature on delegated expertise. This literature in large parts focuses on ecient or optimal contracting by using agency theory. 5 There, a rm owner has to incentivize a manager to act in his interest but is exposed to an information asymmetry, which may lead to shirking or moral hazard by the manager. In standard models of the agency literature (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Holmström, 1979 , and Grossman and Hart, 1983, among others), agents typically are assumed to exert eort in order to increase (the probability of high)
prots. As they dislike eort and eort is not directly observable by the principal, an agency problem arises.
In the literature on delegated expertise, in general, a delegated expert can acquire superior information about a random state of nature and then take a decision based on this information. The principal can only observe the outcome, but does not know on which information the agent's decision was based. Thereby a conict of interest is created. In contrast to literature, this paper abstracts from costs to acquire superior information, but assumes that the agent already has this expertise. 6 Thereby it is closest related to Lambert (1986) , as the agent subsequent does not receive a noisy signal on the success probability of projects, but can observe the actual success probabilities. Given this knowledge, the agent 5 Another perception on executive compensation is the managerial power approach, mainly brought forward by Bebchuk et al. (2002) , Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) . In contrast to ecient-contracting, they believe in powerful, rent-seeking agent that are able to inuence their own pay. For an overview on the contributions in both strands of literature see Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Murphy (2013 Literature has dealt with this problem for systemic risks due to too-big-to-fail 10 , but there is not yet research on the eects of bonus taxation due to a too-manyto-fail problem. As too-big-to-fail only covers large banks and already is in place if only one bank fails, the too-many-to-fail analysis is a meaningful extension which includes smaller banks and collective moral hazard into the analysis. This is especially interesting, when scal jurisdiction only covers a subset of banks such that regulation can not capture all banks collectively. For this analysis, the model is restricted at times in a way that makes it possible to examine the eects of bonus taxation that only adresses one bank.
In the following section, we introduce the general model and derive benchmark results with only one bank. In section 4, the model will be extended towards two banks, where the agents of both banks simultaneously decide on project implementation while they anticipate a bailout if banks fail simultaneously. Section 5
illustrates, how a bonus tax leads to reduced risk taking, both when imposed on one manager only or on both managers. Section 6 concludes.
One Bank -Benchmark Model
The model specication is as follows: There is one risk-neutral shareholder (principal) who delegates the task of implementing a project to a risk-neutral manager (agent). This is done by oering a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the manager, whose payo is subject to a limited liability constraint and who has an exogenous outside option u ≥ 0. If the manager accepts the contract, he decides whether or not to invest into a risky project R. One could think of project R as a possible investment in subprime mortgages. If he decides against project R, no further costs arise for the manager and investment will take place in a safe asset S. Asset S generates a payo s ≥ 0 in any state of the world, e.g. P r (s | S) = 1. In case the manager wants to invest in R, he faces xed costs C > 0 for imple- menting the project. 11 Once implemented R, there exist three states of the world with corresponding returns r H > s ≥ 0 > −r L and their respective probabilities P r (r H ) = p i , P r (s | R) = q and P r (−r L ) = (1 − p i − q). As p i ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1), each return is realized with some probability. This implies a rst informational advantage of the manager vis-á-vis the principal: ex post only realizations r H , s and r L are observable, respectively, but not the agent's actual investment. As the payo s can occur with or without implementing R, the principal can not perfectly infer whether the agent has implemented the risky project or not.
In addition, it is assumed that there is a second source of information asymmetry between the principal and the manager which regards the protability of the risky project R. While the manager (as an expert) before contract signing knows the actual sucess probability p i , the principal only knows the distribution of possible sucess probabilites p i .
Compensation Payments
The principal needs a compensation structure that provides incentives for the agent to make an appropriate decision on the basis of his superior information.
Thus, as compensation for the task of operating the company and implementing the investment project, the manager is oered a state-contingent wage. This pays a xed wage A if the outcome is (−r L ), a wage Y if the outcome is s, and a bonus additionally to the xed wage A if the outcome is r H . For the bonus, the principal remits b ≥ 0 as a fraction of payo r H , which yields a total payment of (A + br H ) if the outcome is r H . As the principal makes losses when the outcome is (−r L ), he has no means to credibly commit to a xed wage A > 0. As the manager is constrained by limited liability, this implies A = 0.
13 Similarly, the principal is nancially not able to pay Y > s. At the same time, it will not be optimal for him to pay Y > u. In this case, either suboptimal rent payments to the agent would be necessary, or the agent would always choose S rather than R.
14 At the end, s and u maily have eects on the protability of the safe asset S, which depends on whether s ≤ u or s ≥ u, and thereby set a payo threshold for the risky project. For the sake of simplicity, we assume s = u = 0 and refer to the safe project S as no project.
q and as u = 0, he will accept any contract for which his expected compensation equals or exceeds implementation costs C, and reject the contract for expected payments below.
As the agent's expected net-compensation p i br h is linear in p i , there exists a thresholdp which determines whether or not to accept the contract. For all p i <p, the environment to invest into the risky project is too unsafe. In expectation, the high (low) cash ow r H (r L ) emerges too seldom (often) in order to yield an expected compensation higher than C. For the opposite case of p >p, the probability of the high (low) cash ow r H (r L ) is large (small) enough to outperform C. In summary, the agent will reject the contract whenever p i <p, and accept the contract for all p i ≥p (being indierent for p i =p).
Following the arguments above, the thresholdp is characterized by a binding Participation Constraint given the bonus payment b by the principal:
Optimization Problem Principal
Taking the agent's optimality condition (1) into account, the principal in the rst stage chooses a bonus parameter b which maximizes his expected payo EP . The principal has no knowlegde about the sucess probability p i , but knows all possible probabilities {p l , p h } and their likelihood to occur. His maximization problem then is:
As explained, equation (3) shows the agent's Participation Constraint (PC), which the principal has to consider. It states that the agent will only accept the on the implemenation of risky projects (in contrast to distortions of managerial eort). For the eects of a bonus tax on managerial eort, it shall be refered to existing studies as Radulescu principal's take-it-or-leave-it oer if his expected compensation at least remunerates him for the exogenous costs C ∈ R + of implementing the risky project. 17 For the Principal, it is clearly optimal to choose a bonus payment which makes the agent's Optimality Condition (1) binding for the lowest probability p * i for which he wants to implement the risky project, thusp ∈ {p l , p h } and b
Corollary 1. Assume that a principal wants the manager to implement the risky project R only if he received a signal
Consider a situation, where the principal may want to implement R only for the high sucess probabililty p h . If he pays a bonus b < C p h r H , the manager rejects the principal's contract oer both when he observes p l or p h . Thus, R will not be implemented for the sucess probability p h even if desired by the principal. If, on the other hand, the principal oers a bonus b >
, he pays a higher bonus than needed to incentivize the manager to accept the contract for a signal p h .
This unnecessary high bonus leaves a rent to the manager, lowers the principal's payo, and therefore can not be optimal for him.
Corollary 2. Assume that a principal wants the manager to implement the risky project R both for signals p i = p l and p i = p h , thusp = p l . Then, optimal compensation is given by
The same argument as above applies if the principal wants to implement R for both p l and p h . For bonuses b < C p l r H , the manager would reject the contract,
implies an inecient high bonus. Thus, the principal only pays
. For the rst one, the agent accepts the contract only for a signal p h , while he accepts the contract for signals p h and p l if he receives the latter (steeper) bonus.
Equilibrium
In order to determine the optimal investment strategy, the principal compares the two dierent possible expected payos EP l and EP h when incentivizingp = p l 17 Note: an Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) is not necessary for this maximization problem. As u = 0, Y = 0 and C > 0, the ICC for implementing R rather than S (given by
orp = p h with each other. Substituting the respective optimal compensation schemes from Corallaries 1 and 2 into the expected payo (2), we get:
Equation (4) denotes the principal's expected payo EP l if he incentivizes the manager to accept the contract for all p i ≥p = p l . For the manager to accept the contract for p l , the principal has to pay a bonus b l = C p l r H . As for p l the sucess probability is low compared to p h , the principal has to give a high share b in order to compensate the manager for his implementation costs C. Due to the fact that b stays constant, but the sucess probability is higher for p h , the manager in expectation gets compensated for C if the signal is p l , but earns a rent
if the signal p h . In return, the principal increases his probability of investing into the risky project (i.e. that the manager accepts the contract and implements R), thereby increasing the chance (risk) to earn r H (lose r L ).
If the principal on the other hand only incentivizes acceptence of the high probability p h (equation (5)), he pays a bonus b h = C p h r H which in expectation perfectly compensates the agent for the implementation costs C if the actual sucess probability is p h . By that, the agent will not accept the contract for p l and the principal earns 0 with probability (1 − γ). 
The agent accepts the contract and implements the risky project for all p h ≥p * . Otherwise, no contract will be signed.
Proof. Directly follows from a comparison of equations (4) and (5) 
As explained above, the principal is faced with a tradeo: he can either pay a rent to the agent, thereby increasing the chance (risk) to earn r H (lose r L ), or he can choose to implement the risky project only for p i = p h , thereby avoid rent payments, but also abandon possible additional prots. In order to induce an agency problem with respect to project choice, we assume that the lower sucess probability p l is too small to generate a positive payo in expectation. Thus, it will be assumed that p l < 
. By that, the principal's increase in expected payo by implementing p l and p h rather than only p h , i.e
smaller than the additional expected incentive costs of a rent to the agent, i.e. γ
collective risk choices are important to increase the likelihood of a bailout.
The too many to fail problem Assume the governemnt can decide whether it grants nancial support to nancially distressed banks. 20 Thereby, it is faced with a tradeo between gains of a bailout (corresponds to welfare costs associated to bank insolvencies) and the cost associated to this action. From a welfare perspective, it will be optimal for the government to bail out banks only if the gains of a bailout are not less than its costs. Assume that both costs and gains depend, next to money involved, on the number of banks failed (with n ⊆ k being the number of banks failed).
Thus, it is assumed that society can stand one failing bank without high welfare the government to grant nancial support to both banks as G (2, r L ) > C (2, r L ).
Equilibrium with anticipated bailouts
Expecting a future bailout as dened above, either because of communication thereof or by anticipating the unjustiable welfare losses a breakup of the nancial system would cause, banks may change their bonus payments and risk taking in equilibrium. Let us assume for a moment, that both banks take the same decision and therefore either both fail, or none. 21 Then, the principal again (as in (4) and (5)) compares expected payos with each other to determine the optimal cuto probability p B i , this time taking into account that the bank does not have to bear losses in the bad state. Thus, r L = 0:
Comparing (7) and (8), the principal has to take two decisions: rst, he has to prove which cuto probability p B i in expectation yields a higher payo, and whether in expectation he can reckon with positive payos at all for the respective cuto probabilityp B = p l orp B = p h . As before, a bank again will never choose to incentivize the manager to accept the contract for the low success probability p l as, due to p l r H < u, EP h > EP l ∀γ. Therefore, the relevant question for the principal is whether he should incentivize the agent to accept the contract and to implement the project for the sucess probability p h . If the principal wants to implement the project only for p h , he still has to pay a bonus b h = for sucess probabilities for which the project in absence of a bailout would yield a negative expected payo to the principal.
21 As banks are symmetric in any aspect, this assumption will be a result in the two (symmetric) pure strategy equilibria illustrated in Lemma 3.
Lemma 2. In absence of bailout policy, project implementation is protable for the principal only for sucess probabilities p h ∈ P h , P h ≡ [p * , 1). If there is a bailout, project implementation becomes protable also for sucess probabilities p h ∈
Let us focus on sucess probabilities p h ∈ P h . Whether there is a bailout at all depends upon the other bank's decision, as by Denition 1 banks only receive a bailout if they collectively fail. Therefore, for sucess probabilities p h ∈ P h , it is only protable to implement the project if also the other bank implements the project. If bank 2 does not implement the project, the project yields a negative expected payo for bank 1. Thus, each bank has two strategic choices with respect to the oered incentive payments for the manager, depending on the other bank's action: either, it will choose to pay a bonus according to Corollary 1 that optimally incentivizes the manager to implement the project (I) for a signal p h , or the bank does not oer an appropriate bonus, the manager will reject the contract and thus the project is not going to be implemented (N). For sucess probabilities p h ∈ P h , this gives us four combinations: (I, I), (I, N ), (N, I) and (N, N ). and banks receive a bailout according to Denition 1. Then, for sucess probabilities p h ∈ P h , there exist two (symmetric) pure strategy equilibria where both principals either 1. refrain from project implementation and do not oer a contract to the manager,
or implement the project by oering a bonus rate
The pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with project implementation is payo dominant compared to refraining from implementation. Thus, the best response by bank 2 is to refrain from the project as well and earn zero prot.
In the second case, assume bank 1 wants to implement the project for p h ∈ P h and oers a bonus b h = C p h r H that will be accepted by the agent. In this case, bank 2 can be sure to receive a bailout if it implements the project as well and fails. Both banks together are collectively systemic and will be rescued. Knowing this, investments become protable also for lower sucess probabilities p h ∈ P h (as EP
. Thus, the best respond by bank 2 to higher risk taking by bank 1 is to also increase risk taking by oering a contract for p h ∈ P h as well. In contrast to the one-bank case, the bank now neglects the expected costs of failing as those are going to be socialized. The anticipated bailout provides an externality to the bank such that it takes more risk than it would do on an individual basis.
Welfare implications of collective Moral Hazard
Whether an increase in risk taking is desirable or not depends on its welfare implications and thus on assumptions on the welfare function and the succes probabilities p i . As this paper focuses on eciency concerns rather than redistribution, also welfare is assumed to be maximal when eciency is maximal. Thereby, an efcient outcome is assumed to be in place, if the principal would have implemented it also in a rst best world in absence of any externalities (e.g. bailout) and information asymmetries (e.g. non-observability of the actual success probability by the principal).
In absence of an agency problem, an optimal compensation scheme for the principal pays the manager his implementation costs C whenever he implements the risky project and zero if he does not. For these compensation costs, the principal wants to implement the project as long as his expected payo equals or exceeds his own outside option, i.e. p i r H − (1
Denition 2. An investment decision is ecient if and only if
Comparing the cuto levels with information asymmetryp * and with distorted risk taking due to an anticipated bailoutp B to the ecient investment decision dened above, the following has been shown: Proposition 1. Suppose banks are aware of the potential systemic risk they collectively can cause and thus can expect a bailout if they jointly fail. Then, they can coordinate on an equilibrium where both take on higher risk than the socially desirable level they would decide upon on an individual level.
Proof. This is due to the fact that the principal has to bear a real risk and losses of −r L < 0 when there is no bailout, while he will not suer losses when there is a bailout. Thus, the principal will accept risky projects also for lower success probabilities for which he would not incentivize the manager in absence of a bailout.
As a bailout will only be executed if two banks fail at the same time, Lemma 3 highlights that higher risk taking is indeed an equilibrium if banks anticipate the bailout policy. Moreover, this equilibrium is payo dominant compared to the equilibrium where both banks refrain from implementing the project and stay with their outside option for p h ∈ P h . Thus, when anticipating bailouts due to a too-many-to-fail systemic risk, banks can coordinate on a socially undesirable equilibrium where both increase their risk taking by implementing risky projects also for lower sucess probabilities.
Bonus Taxation
To analyze the welfare eects of a bonus tax under existence of too-many-to-fail bailout policies, an additonal stage will be introduced into the model: before the take-it-or-leave-it contract is oered to the manager, the government can implement a bonus tax. Introducing this, bonus payments become subject to a bonus tax, t b ∈ [0; 1), which has to be paid by the managers. Therefore, from gross compensation p i br h , managers only receive expected net-compensation payments of p i (1 − t b ) br h < p i br h if they accept the contract.
Eects of a tax on managers' bonuses
Assume that the government introduced a bonus tax for bonus payments to the manager. As the manager now has to bear the additional tax burden, also his optimal threshold levelp changes to:
For a given bonus b, a bonus tax will lead to an increased threshold levelp t for the minimum success probability for which the manager accepts the contract. Or, if the principal wants to incentivize a given threshold levelp, the bonus payment b t to the manager has to be increased in a way, that the manager is fully compensated for the bonus tax. In either way, a bonus tax in expectation is associated with higher costs for the principal, either in terms of lost expected prots due to a higher threshold probability, or in terms of higher compensation payments.
Again, banks can expect a future bailout as denoted in section 4 when both banks take the same actions. In addition, the principal now takes into account the associated costs from the bonus tax when deciding upon the optimal threshold probabilityp t . Thereby, expected payos (7) and (8) for the dierent threshold levels p l and p h change to EP t l and EP t h :
As seen in section 4, an expected bailout inuences possible additional prots by eliminating the risk of loosing r L . The newly introduced bonus tax on the other hand aects the costs of incentive payments. While net incentive payments to the agent stay constant, the principal's costs of incentive payments increase the higher the bonus tax is. Therefore, it becomes more and more expensive to incentivize the agent to accept the contract.
Whether or not a bonus tax can reverse the principals distorted risk taking of p h ∈ P h ∪ P h in presence of bailouts back to the benchmark threshold p h ∈ P h , depends upon the extent to which bonuses are taxed. In order that it is protable for the principal to incentivize the manager to implement the project solely for p h ∈ P h , the cuto probability under taxationp t must equal the optimal cuto probabilityp * dened in Lemma 1. For the bonus tax to be eective in reversing the threshold for the success probability in spite of bailouts to the benchmarkt, the proper tax rate is given by t b =
is eective in reversing the threshold probability fromp
. Thereby, the bonus tax exactly balances the externality a bailout entails and thus reduces bank's incentives 20 for risk taking to the socially desired level. On the other hand, if t b > t * b , the bonus tax is set too high and thereby prevents socially optimal risk taking. In this case, banks will incentivize too little risk taking as necessary incentive payments are too expensive, i.e.p * <p t . Only for a tax rate t * b , the cuto probability for the risky project to be protable under collective Moral Hazardp t coincides with the socially optimal cuto probabilitŷ p opt . Therefore, only for t * b , the bonus tax exactly balances the externality a bailout entails.
Nevertheless, project protability in big parts still depends on the expectation of a bailout. In a similar fashion as in the case without bonus tax, banks have comparable best responses as in Lemma 3 to strategies of the other bank. As thresholds have changed due to the bonus tax, it is optimal to oer the following contracts to the agent: Lemma 5. Suppose that p l < Banks reduce risk taking again and so in expectation earn lower expected payos than without bonus tax. As a side eect, banks not only reduce risk taking, but also have to bear higher incentive payments for the manager due to the bonus tax.
As a result, banks earn less than without a bonus tax. The dierence between both payos exactly equals the bonus tax revenue the government collects.
Nonwithstanding the above discussed welfare improving eects of a proper bonus tax, there still exists another pure strategy equilibrium where a bonus tax causes welfare losses. Suppose banks do not coordinate on the equilibrium with collective Moral Hazard analyzed above but on the payo dominated equilibrium where banks refrain from project implementation for sucess probabilities p h ∈ P h . In this case, a bailout does not distort risk taking from the socially desirable thresholdp * =p opt to the coordinated excessive-risk taking thresholdp B .
Rather, a bonus tax causes distortions for this equilibrium. Any bonus tax t b > 0 ceteris paribus lowers banks' payos and thereby distorts their optimization problem. Internalizing the bonus tax through the requirement of higher compensation payments for the manager, both banks will only implement the risky project if
; otherwise they will not make a contract oer to the manager.
any bonus tax will lead to inecient low risk taking by banks. For this equilibrium, a bonus tax tries to balance the externality of a bailout, that actually did not lead to distortions in rst place.
Discriminatory or unilateral bonus taxation
One of the main characteristics of the banking sector is its degree of integration, also across countries. To study the eects of a bonus tax in a stylized international framework, it is valuable to analyze a situation of discriminatory bonus taxation between the two banks. This assumption makes it possible to examine the eects of bonus taxation that only adresses one bank and thus the eects of unilateral bonus taxation, when cross-national coordination is not possible. 22 In the international context, bailouts linked to systemic risk due to a too-many-to-fail problem often are executed by supranational organizations like central banks in order to prevent contagion. For nancially distressed banks in the Eurozone for example, the ECB introduced non-standard monetary policy measures in order to keep contagion in nancial markets contained. 23 As a result, bank regulation at the moment still is mainly a national responsibility, whereas resolution is undertaken already on a supranational level.
Suppose only manager 1 is subject to a bonus tax. By that, for manager 1 the optimality condition under presence of a bonus tax (9) applies, whereas for manager 2 the optimality condition without taxation (1) are not symmetric anymore, but change compared to sections 4 and 5.
As in the case without bonus tax, for bank 2 it is optimal to oer the following contracts to the agent: if bank 1 wants to implement the project for p h ∈ P h , bank 2 should as well oer an according contract to the agent. If on the other hand bank 1 does not implement the project for p h ∈ P h , bank 2`s best response is too abstain from according incentive payments, too. For bank 1 on the other hand, best responses to the actions of bank 2 change due to a proper bonus tax t * b .
Assume bank 2 does not want the project to be implemented for p h ∈ P h . Then, 22 Ex ante, for supranational regulation cross-national coordination is necessary, but is often dicult to implement. In this sense, the possibility of discriminatory taxation is equivalent to a situation where banks are located in dierent countries with dierent scal jurisdiction but a single economic area. for the same arguments as above, also the best response by bank 1 is to abstain from project implementation as it would be the only failing bank. In expectation, project implementation for p h ∈ P h yields a loss. But in contrast to bank 2 and due to bonus taxation, project implementation for p h ∈ P h even yields a loss in expectation for bank 1 even if both banks invested and therefore can expect a bailout if −r L occurs. Assume bank 2 chooses to incentivize implementation for p h ∈ P h . Without a bonus tax but anticipating the too-many-to-fail problem, the best response of bank 1 would be incentivizing project implementation for p h as well. With the bonus tax however, incentive compensation for the agent's higher risk taking becomes too expensive for the principal to outweigh the prots of the project. Therefore he abstains from higher risk taking, and chooses to refrain from project implementatation for p h ∈ P h . 
Bank 1 (2) oers a bonus rate b implemented also in absence of bailouts. In doing this, a taxation of bonuses of manager 1 imposes an externality not only on that manager's bank, but also to bank 2. This is done by increasing necessary incentive payments to the manager in a way, that bank 1 is not willing anymore to nance those costs. As a result, the equilibrium (I, I), which is payo dominant for p h ∈ P h without bonus taxation, becomes payo dominated for the taxed bank. Altough it will stay a payo dominant response for bank 2 to implement the project for a sucess probability p h ∈ P h when bank 1 implements the project as well, it will no longer be a mutual best response in presence of taxation: As the untaxed bank 2 will always incentivize project implementation for p h ∈ P h , it is protable for bank 1 to do so as well. On the other hand, as bank 1 will abstain from implementation for p h ∈ P h , it is also not protable for bank 2 to invest for p h ∈ P h . Due to this fact, there is an unique equilibrium where both banks incentivize their agents to implement the project for the high sucess probability (for p h ∈ P h ), but refrain from project implementation and do not oer a contract to the agent for p h ∈ P h . Proposition 3. Suppose banks are aware of the potential systemic risk they collectively cause and thus can expect a bailout if they jointly fail. Then, a bonus tax t * b is welfare improving even if only one bank is taxed. The bonus tax breaks collective Moral Hazard and eliminates the equilibrium with excessive risk taking.
Proof. Directly follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 4 and 6.
Thus, bonus taxation of only one bank eliminates the equilibrium with higher risk taking and leads to a reduction of risk taking of both banks, the taxed one and the untaxed one. At the same time, bonus taxation of a single bank unambiguously can not cause negative welfare eects as it can be the case if both banks are taxed and do not coordinate on the payo dominant equilibrium. 6 Conclusion
In this paper, a symmetric principal-agent structure with two banks was modelled where the agents' task was implementation of a project up to a certain risk.
This was used to study the eects of too-many-to-fail bailout policies and bonus taxation on risk taking, compensation and welfare.
With respect to the eects of bailout policies, the following has been shown:
If banks can anticipate bailouts due to a too-many-to-fail bailout policy it is protable for them to incentivize agents to implement the project also for lower success probabilities. Thus, if banks foresee that they are systemic in a herd, they invest riskier than they would do in absence of a possible bailout.
Introducing a bonus tax can reduce the risk taking externality a bailout causes.
If the bank manager is taxed by a bonus tax, he requests a higher gross bonus payment to be compensated for the additional tax burden. Therby incentive payments for risk taking become more expensive for the bank. Given that the bonus tax rate is properly chosen, the increase in expenses leads to lower risk taking by the manager. Due to the specialty of too-many-to-fail bailout policies and their dependency on collective bankruptcy, reduced risk taking in one bank also leads to lower risk taking in the other bank. Thus, it is sucient that only the manager of one bank is taxed by a bonus tax. Translating this into a multicountry framework leads to the result that unilateral bonus taxation can prevent risk taking in the other country and thereby improve welfare in both countries. As a conclusion, proper bonus taxation in this model reduces a gamble for bailouts not only for the taxed bank, but also increases market discipline of other banks. Thus, the tax is also eective in reducing risk taking if only introduced on an unilateral level without global coordination.
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